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Abstract
This is an annotated transcription of Noam Chomsky’s keynote presentation at the University 
of Reading, in May 2017. Here, Chomsky reviews some foundational aspects of the theory of 
structure building: essentially, Merge and Label. The aim is to eliminate what he refers to as exten-
sions of Merge which are seemingly incompatible with the Strong Minimalist Thesis while still 
accounting for recursive structure, displacement, and reconstruction (as the main empirical goals 
of the Minimalist Program). These include sidewards movement, multi-dominance, and late-
Merge; all of which have been developed throughout the life cycle of transformational generative 
grammar. Furthermore, Chomsky formulates a series of conditions that an adequate formulation of 
Merge must meet, and sketches how the aforementioned extensions may violate these conditions. 
Chomsky arrives at a formulation of an operation MERGE, which maintains the core properties of 
Merge but is further restricted by limitations over what MERGE can do to the workspaces where 
syntactic operations apply.
Keywords: Strong Minimalist Thesis; workspaces; MERGE; recursion
Resum. Alguns problemes fonamentals desconcertants: el programa de Reading
Aquesta és una transcripció anotada de la presentació principal de Noam Chomsky a la Universitat 
de Reading, el maig de 2017. Aquí Chomsky revisa alguns aspectes fundacionals de la teoria de 
la construcció d’estructures: fonamentalment, fusió i etiquetatge. L’objectiu és eliminar allò que 
aquest autor anomena extensions de fusió, que aparentment són incompatibles amb la tesi minima-
lista forta, i continuar donant compte de l’estructura recursiva, el desplaçament i la reconstrucció 
(com a principals objectius empírics del programa minimalista). Aquests inclouen el moviment 
lateral, la multidominància i la fusió tardana, que s’han desenvolupat al llarg del cicle de vida de 
la gramàtica generativa transformacional. A més a més, Chomsky formula una sèrie de condicions 
que ha de complir una formulació adequada de fusió i indica que les extensions esmentades poden 
violar aquestes condicions. Chomsky arriba a la formulació d’una operació fusió que manté les 
* This talk took place at the University of Reading, in May 11th, 2017 as part of an international 
Colloquium: Generative Grammar in the 21st century: the evidence and the rhetoric. The 
video recording of the talk is available at <https://www.facebook.com/theuniversityofreading/
videos/1115026661937460/>. The talk was transcribed and annotated by Diego Gabriel Krivochen 
and Douglas Saddy, who take responsibility for any mistakes.
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propietats bàsiques de fusió però que queda restringida per limitacions sobre el que la fusió pot 
fer en els espais de treball on s’apliquen les operacions sintàctiques.
Paraules clau: tesi minimalista forta; espais de treball; fusió; recursió
When I hear about the work of the 1950s I always try to put myself in the position 
of a 17 year old kid in my first linguistics class in the 1940s. I imagine how it would 
have felt if someone got up and started talking about a book he wrote in 1885. Why 
bother? But that’s what this [talk] is about.
I’d like to discuss some foundational issues which are unsettled and I think are 
rather troublesome, and that bear directly on a number of very important issues 
in current work and I think raise questions about the legitimacy of problems and 
challenges we have faced. So just a brief comment on background assumptions. 
The basic question we face is ‘what is the Language Faculty?’, ‘what is Universal 
Grammar (UG)?’; there is good reason to seek the simplest possible answers to this. 
One reason is just general methodology: simplicity is approximately the same 
as explanatory depth, we’re looking for explanation – topics that were explored 
extensively in the 1950s by Nelson Goodman.1 Another interesting comment that 
bears on our own history, I think, is by Richard Feynman, the Nobel laureate. 
When he received the Nobel Prize, he reviewed a number of developments in 
Physics and pointed out that, in every case the interesting results were reached 
from several different points of view and suggested that the characterization of 
explanatory depth – simplicity – is reaching the same conclusion by independent 
paths.2 He pointed out that although these approaches turned out to be physically 
equivalent, they were psychologically different in that the different approaches 
suggested different ways to approach the innumerable unanswered questions that 
arise whenever a result is reached, and it opens up new puzzles. I think we find 
things like that too [in Linguistics]. So I think that’s one reason for seeking the 
simplest solution.
The second reason is a dictum of Galileo’s, which has served sciences pretty 
well for 500 years – therefore, worth taking seriously –, namely, that Nature is 
1. See, for example, Goodman (1968: Chapter 4), which summarizes much of his previous work on 
the syntax of symbolic systems.
2. The relevant fragment is the following (Feynman, Nobel lecture, Dec. 11th, 1965)
   It always seems odd to me that the fundamental laws of physics, when discovered, can appear in 
so many different forms that are not apparently identical at first, but, with a little mathematical 
fiddling you can show the relationship. An example of that is the Schrödinger equation and the 
Heisenberg formulation of quantum mechanics. I don’t know why this is - it remains a mystery, 
but it was something I learned from experience. There is always another way to say the same 
thing that doesn’t look at all like the way you said it before. I don’t know what the reason for 
this is. I think it is somehow a representation of the simplicity of nature. A thing like the inverse 
square law is just right to be represented by the solution of Poisson’s equation, which, there-
fore, is a very different way to say the same thing that doesn’t look at all like the way you said 
it before. I don’t know what it means, that nature chooses these curious forms, but maybe that 
is a way of defining simplicity. Perhaps a thing is simple if you can describe it fully in several 
different ways without immediately knowing that you are describing the same thing.
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in fact simple and it’s the task of the scientists to show how that’s the case,3 be 
it the motion of planets, the tides, the flight of birds or, in our case, the nature of 
Language. 
And there’s a third reason, which is specific to the study of Language and fairly 
recent in our understanding of its import, and that has to do with human evolution 
and the evolution of language (by which I mean the evolution of the Language 
Faculty). We don’t know a lot about it, but we know something, and there are 
recent discoveries that strongly suggest that language emerged along with anatomi-
cally modern humans or maybe slightly later and has remained stable ever since.4 
Certainly, it arose before the separation of humans, which by a number of genome 
analyses has been shown to be not long after humans emerged, roughly 200.000 
years ago. There’s a very interesting paper on this by Riny Huijbregts.5 Well, if 
that’s true, and it seems to be, then whatever emerged just has to be very simple: 
there were no selectional factors involved, there was just resort to some natural 
principle. Since it [Language] emerged suddenly and never changed, then it has to 
be a simple object, and that’s what we should be looking for.
As a side comment, I think there are by now some reasons (I am not going to 
review them) to suppose that the core I-language (internal language) generates solely 
representations on one interface: C-I (Conceptual Intentional interface), essentially 
a kind of language of thought.6 And that’s probably close to, or probably we will 
discover totally invariant among human beings. It seems that the complexity, the 
variety of language arise overwhelmingly if not completely from the ancillary opera-
tions which lead to externalization which we know draws upon our sensory motor 
system. And it’s pretty natural that that should be complex and vary because you 
have to match two systems that essentially have nothing to do with one another. The 
internal system seems to have arisen pretty suddenly along with modern humans 
and the SM (Sensory-Motor) system have been around for hundreds of thousands, 
in some cases millions of years, and have absolutely nothing to do with language. 
So when we try to connect these two things, it’s necessarily going to be a complex 
operation, and in fact the external operations, although they certainly follow princi-
ples and rules of a restricted variety they nevertheless violate just about any principle 
of computational complexity one can imagine, and they do vary a lot, change a lot, 
generation to generation and so on. So I’ll just assume that, admittedly without 
3. This idea can be found, for instance, in Dialogo sopra i due massimi sistemi del mondo (1632).
4. See Berwick & Chomsky (2016) for discussion.
5. See, for instance, Huijbregts (2017).
6. See Fodor (1975, 2008). It may be worth pointing out that:
   the language-of-thought hypothesis endorsed in LOT 1 wasn’t just any old hyper-realism about 
the mental; it was, in particular, a species of RTM (that is, of the representational theory of mind). 
Roughly, but near enough for present purposes, RTM is a claim about the metaphysics of cogni-
tive mental states and processes: Tokens of cognitive mental states are tokens of relations between 
creatures and their mental representations. Tokens of mental processes are ‘computations’; that is, 
causal chains of (typically inferential) operations on mental representations. There is no tokening 
of a (cognitive) mental state or process (by a creature, at a time) unless there is a corresponding 
tokening of a mental representation (by that creature, at that time). (Fodor 2008: 5-6)
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any arguments – it’s been discussed elsewhere – and take a look at the generative 
mechanisms for the core I-Language mapping to C-I. 
There are a number of questions, and problems, that arise; I will give a couple 
of examples of problems that I think are troublesome, and then go back and talk 
about how we can address them. 
So to take one, consider the rule raising to subject and then the same rule of 
raising to object.7 Raising to subject is the consequence of accepting the predicate-
internal subject hypothesis. So there’s this two rules and how they work. I had a 
proposal in my paper Problems of Projection, which was counter-cyclic8 but it 
worked at the time. There was a good critique of it by Sam Epstein, Kitahara and 
Seely. They pointed out that first of all it violated the Extension Condition,9 but 
much more seriously it involves an extra operation, a complex operation of sub-
stitution10 of the newly Merged element in exactly in the place where it originally 
 7. In Rosenbaum (1965: 12), raising to subject was known as Pronoun Substitution. Raising to object 
is a case of NP complementation with for-to COMP deletion. Perlmutter (1968: 36) proposes a 
general raising rule which ‘takes an NP out of the embedded sentence and moves it up into the 
higher sentence’. Postal (1974) describes both processes, raising to object and raising to subject 
as a single rule of movement (1974: 267), and defines the rule Raising, crucially, as a cyclic rule.
 8. It is useful in this context to first review the so-called ‘Cyclic principle’: essentially, when one domain 
to which transformations can apply is contained in another, relevant transformations apply to the 
smaller domain first, then proceeding to the wider domain. To quote Halle & Chomsky (1960: 275):
   The modifications [i.e., transformations] are introduced in a stepwise fashion, successive steps 
reflecting the influence of successively higher constituents. Note also that the same modifications 
apply to all constituents regardless of their place in the constituent hierarchy; the same rules 
are reapplied to each constituent in a repeating cycle until the highest constituent is reached. 
The final result of such a cyclical reapplication of the same rules reflects to a certain extent the 
stress distribution of the morphemes as parts of lower constituents. 
  Chomsky (1973) formulates the Strict Cyclic Condition (SSC) as follows:
   No rule can apply to a domain dominated by a cyclic node [at the time, NP, S’] in such a way 
to affect solely a proper subdomain of A dominated by a node B which is also a cyclic node.
  Thus, a rule that targets a proper subdomain of a cyclic node is referred to as counter-cyclic. For 
example, in Chomsky (1995: 190), the ungrammaticality of *How did John wonder what Mary 
fixed thow is blamed on the counter-cyclicity of the operation that raises how to the matrix Spec-CP, 
later raising what to the embedded Spec-CP. 
  The ‘counter-cyclicity’ that Chomsky mentions here can be exemplified as follows: if operations 
at T are triggered by C, then [C [T seem [α Bill to have left]]] must be derivationally prior to the 
structure [C [T Bill seems [α Bill to have left]]]. But because raising Bill affects, precisely, a proper 
subdomain of the cycle CP, this application of raising-to-subject is counter-cyclic. See Epstein, 
Kitahara & Seely (2014). 
 9. Formulated as follows:
   Suppose we restrict substitution operations still further, requiring that Ø be external to the 
targeted phrase marker K. Thus, GT and Move-α extend K to K*, which includes K as a proper 
part. (Chomsky 1995: 190) 
  An even stricter version of the SSC, as Chomsky (1995: 190) observes, includes the effects of 
the EC. 
10. Chomsky (1995: 248) defines that 
   substitution forms L = {H(K), {α, K}} where H(K) is the head (= the label) of the projected ele-
ment K, where K is a term of K. If L is a term of K, then the members of the members of L are 
terms of K (1995: 247), and adds that
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appeared, which is quite a complex operation. Counter-cyclicity is about the same 
as Late Merge,11 so this critique holds for everything that is done with what’s called 
Late Merge: it’s completely unacceptable, because it involves operations that are 
complex, unmotivated, they have nothing to do with the goal we think we ought 
to obtain, something like the Strong Minimalist Thesis (SMT).12 These considera-
tions become far more significant in the case of what are sometimes called exotic 
constructions, those which have virtually no evidence, maybe none, available for 
the child; things like Antecedent-Contained deletion13 or Across-the-Board move-
ment, Parasitic gaps… It’s simply impossible to propose a new principle for those, 
it can’t be. The child has no evidence for them if he has to understand them. It must 
be the application of principles that are available for simple, easy, normal cases. 
So, in fact every kind of construction is in fact pretty exotic of the kind that Charles 
(Yang) was talking about but some are extremely so thus leading to the invocation 
of operations like counter-cyclicity, Late-Merge… completely unacceptable. We 
will rule this as part of the problems that we have to deal with. A lot of these pro-
posals about Late Merge give very interesting descriptive results, bring all sorts of 
interesting ideas but without any basis, so what are apparently solutions are in fact 
problems, problems that now have to be addressed. And there’s quite a lot of work 
like that, counter-cyclicity, Late Merge… One example is called Parallel Merge,14 
   For the case of substitution, terms correspond to nodes of the informal representations, where 
each node is understood to stand for the subtree of which it is the root (1995: 247)
 thus respecting the Extension Condition (and therefore, the SSC). See fn. 31 below for the original 
(1995) formulation of Merge in terms of substitution as a Generalized Transformation.
11. See Stepanov (2001), in turn based on Lebeaux (1988): their proposal concerns the post-cyclic 
adjunction of XPs given (i) certain anti-reconstruction effects with respect to Condition C of 
Binding Theory, (ii) asymmetries on opacity in wh-extraction between arguments and adjuncts, 
(iii) Nissenbaum’s (1998) analysis of parasitic gaps, (iv) the timing of Affix Hopping and adjunct 
intervenience effects, (v) multiple wh-fronting in Slavic and its interaction with Superiority (and, 
incidentally, the SSC), (vi) Principle A effects in relative clauses (which are taken to be adjoined 
structures). It is essential to bear in mind that Chomsky-adjunction must not be confused with 
Joshi-style adjunction in the framework of Tree Adjoining Grammars (Joshi 1985 and much related 
work).
12. In the words of Chomsky (2000: 96): Language is an optimal solution to legibility conditions. These 
legibility conditions are imposed by the external systems, Conceptual-Intentional and Sensory-
Motor over the outputs of the Narrow Syntax (Merge + Agree + Move). See the discussion in 
Chomsky (2000: 112, ff.) for more details.
13. Cases like John likes every boy Mary does [like t]. See Fox (2002) for an analysis along the lines 
Chomsky is referring to here.
14. Citko (2005: 476)
   The existence of External Merge and Internal Merge predicts the existence of a third type, 
combining the properties of both. This third type, which I will refer to as Parallel Merge, is like 
External Merge in that it involves two distinct rooted objects (α and β), but it is like Internal 
Merge in that it combines the two by taking a subpart of one of them.
  We can diagram the situation as follows, where α is a complex object {α, {α, γ}}:
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which relies on work on multidimensionality, Sidewards Merge,15 a lot of things in 
the literature. I’ll come back to. But all of them are equally problematic for these 
reasons, particularly when they are used for more or less exotic constructions. In 
this particular case, raising to subject and object there seems to be an easy answer. 
The easy answer, which is in my recent papers, is simply to drop the condition 
that Internal Merge (Movement) has to be triggered, so it’s free, like External 
Merge.16 In fact, that’s an improvement, we should never have had that condition. 
So dropping that condition, there’s quite a straightforward cyclic analysis so we’re 
in good shape in this particular case. But that’s not true generally: if you look at 
the uses of Late Merge in the literature, a lot of them have interesting descriptive 
consequences, but don’t have easy answers. There might be some answers, but they 
have to be worked on, these are challenges.
Well, that’s the first kind of problem, but I am concerned with an extension 
of it, and there are many extensions of what is called Merge, but are not really 
Merge, in the literature, which raise very serious questions of legitimacy. Some 
of them in fact yield direct violations of quite sound principles. So they raise 
several questions.
15. As per Nunes (2004: 93, ff.) we can exemplify and illustrate Sidewards Movement (which assumes 
the Copy + Merge theory of movement) as follows:
 i)  a given constituent α is copied from K and merges with the independent syntactic object L.
  [K …αi…] → Copy αi → Merge(αi, L), where [L …], yielding [K …αi…] , [M αi [L …]]
 ii)  at this point, the two copies of α cannot form a chain because they are not in a c-command 
relation. Thus, K and M are put together forming a new syntactic object XP, in which the copies 
of α can be in a c-command relation.
  [XP [K …αi…] [X’ [X] [M αi [L …]]]]
   Note that K c-commands M, but neither copy c-commands the other (being embedded within 
K and M respectively). 
 iii)  If there is a higher head Y which selects a copy of α, such that YP transitively dominates XP 
and there is a copy of α in Spec-Y, this higher copy can form two distinct chains with the 
instances of α in both K and M.
16. An idea that goes all the way back to Lasnik & Saito’s (1984) Affect-α. For triggered Internal 
Merge, see Chomsky (1995) and the argument about displacement, uninterpretable features, and 
language perfection in Chomsky (2000). Chomsky (2004: 110) defends Free Merge in the following 
terms:
   NS [Narrow Syntax] is based on the free operation Merge. SMT entails that Merge of α, β is 
unconstrained, therefore either external or internal. 
  And, in footnote 29 (2004: 125):
   For over forty years, there have been efforts to motivate displacement. That seems to have been 
a mistake. Recourse to any device to account for the displacement phenomena also is mistaken 
unless it is independently motivated (as is Internal Merge). If this is correct, then the radically 
simplified form of transformational grammar (‘Move-α’ and its variants) is a kind of conceptual 
necessity, given the undeniable existence of displacement phenomena.
  Chomsky (2008: 139) adopts a different position, though, imposing a feature requirement on 
External Merge:
   For an LI [Lexical Item] to be able to enter into a computation, merging with some SO [Syntactic 
Object], it must have some property permitting this operation. A property of an LI is called a 
feature, so an LI has a feature that permits it to be merged. Call this the edge feature (EF) of 
the LI. If an LI lacks EF, it can only be a full expression in itself; an interjection.
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The first question is ‘how can they be ruled out?’, ‘what’s a proper definition 
of Merge that rules them out?’, and the second question is ‘how do we deal with 
the descriptive results that are presented and described as solutions but we should 
think of as problems of the analyses?’ A third kind of problem is raised by a 
very important part of what Charles Yang just talked about, his work on language 
acquisition,17 which has some pretty remarkable results on the basis of very simple 
assumptions, basically the Elsewhere condition18 and the assumption that listing 
something carries a cost for acquisition (which is almost tautological). On the 
basis of just those two assumptions he, along with Sam Gutmann, have managed 
to reach a very specific result, a definite tipping point that tells you –as much as 
possible– exactly where you should set a productive rule instead of listing.19 And 
there are some pretty remarkable empirical results also for the first time on princi-
ples determining the core versus periphery distinction, quite valuable.
Now, the relevance for my concerns here however is different. One is that the 
work highlights the fact that we should keep in mind that an important condition 
on language design is that the languages should be learnable, it should be possible 
to acquire them. In fact, if language couldn’t be acquired, it wouldn’t survive. 
And that highlights the fact that we are not doing general recursion, we are not 
studying proof theory or metamathematics, we are studying a particular organic 
system which has its own natural conditions that it must meet, and that turns out 
to be important.20 
17. Specifically, Yang (2016).
18. First formulated with this name in Kiparsky (1973: 94), see also Anderson (1969: 139-144), who 
calls it ‘principle of disjunctive ordering’ and points towards antecedents in Panini. The general 
formulation in Kiparsky (1982: 8) suffices for present purposes:
  Rules A and B in the same component apply disjunctively to a form ϕ if and only if: 
  (i)  the structural description of A (the special rule) properly includes the structural description 
of B (the general rule)
  (ii)  the result of applying A to ϕ is distinct from the result of applying B to ϕ. 
  In that case, A is applied first, and if it takes effect, then B is not applied.
19. Chomsky is referring here to the Tolerance Principle, proposed in Yang (2016: 64):
 Let R be a rule applicable to N items, of which e are exceptions. R is productive if and only iff
20. See Turing (1952). The combination of purely formal and biological considerations is evident in 
the following passage:
   The model [a mathematical model of the growing embryo] takes two slightly different forms. In one 
of them the cell theory is recognized but the cells are idealized into geometrical points. In the other 
the matter of the organism is imagined as continuously distributed. The cells are not, however, 
completely ignored, for various physical and physico-chemical characteristics of the matter as a 
whole are assumed to have values appropriate to the cellular matter. (Turing 1952: 37)
  Given the enormous complexity of the matter, Turing makes the following methodological 
choice, which echoes much biolinguistic work
   The interdependence of the chemical and mechanical data adds enormously to the difficulty, 
and attention will therefore be confined, so far as is possible, to cases where these can be 
separated. The mathematics of elastic solids is a well-developed subject, and has often been 
applied to biological systems. In this paper it is proposed to give attention rather to cases where 
the mechanical aspect can be ignored and the chemical aspect is the most significant. (Turing 
1952: 38)
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Beyond that, there’s a specific consequence of Charles’ work, namely, if you 
take a look at it, his results depend on the assumption that rules are determinate 
[i.e., deterministic]: that means, if the structural conditions for a rule are met, the 
structural change has to take place in a fixed and determinate manner, and if you 
don’t have that property, his results don’t follow. And it’s a pretty natural property, 
except it is violated all over the place. So take Phrase Structure Grammar (PSG):21 
if in a PSG you generate the structure, say:
1) NP, V, NP
And you have the rule
2) NP → Det, N
Then it’s not deterministic. It could be either of the two NPs: the structural 
description is met, but you don’t know what the result is. So that kind of rule 
really ought to be ruled out by the principle of determinacy. And it turns out that 
for these extensions of Merge that I’ve mentioned it’s almost always violated. 
And it turns out one of the many considerations as to why they are unacceptable. 
Again, all these problems are particularly acute with the exotic constructions, the 
methodological principle is violated all over the place in descriptive practice, and 
it should be kept in mind. 
Over the years, whenever some descriptive device has been introduced, 
and whatever it is (PSG, transformations, X-bar theory, parameters, phases, 
whatever it might be), almost always it tends to be used pretty extravagantly, 
well beyond the basis, of any solid foundation for the rule. And that’s partly 
because it’s not characterized explicitly enough, so there’s a lot of vagueness 
in the periphery which is exploited for the descriptive purposes. And that’s not 
necessarily a criticism. A good example, in fact, is Generative Semantics:22 
21. See, e.g., Post (1943: 203, ff.), who presents what are known as ‘Post canonical systems’. Also 
Chomsky (1959); Postal (1964); Kuroda (1964) and, for a perspective closer to automata theory, 
Hopcroft and Ullman (1969). Greibach (1965: 43, Definition 1.1) defines PSGs as follows:
   By a psg (I, T, X, ℘) we mean a context-free phrase structure grammar where
   (1)  I is a finite vocabulary of intermediate symbols,
   (2)  T is a finite vocabulary of terminal symbols and I ∩ T = ϕ,
   (3)  X is the designated initial symbol [i.e., the root in terms of trees, the axiom in proof theoretic 
terms] and X ∈ I,
   (4)  The rules of ℘ are of the forms, Z → AY1…Yn, n ≥ 1, Z ∈ I, A,Yi ∈ I ⋃ T, and Z → α, Z ∈ I, 
α ∈ T.
 Linguistically, they neatly capture Immediate Constituent analyses, and are opposed to Dependency 
Grammars.
22. See McCawley (1968 [1973]); Lakoff (1971); Lakoff & Ross (1976) (and also Dowty 1979). 
The basic tenets of a ‘vanilla’ GS (the common aspects to all variants) are presented clearly in 
McCawley (1968 [1973]: 155-156):
   (1)  Semantic structures are claimed to be of the same formal nature as syntactic structures, 
namely labeled trees whose non-terminal node-labels are the same set of labels that appear 
in surface structure. 
Some Puzzling Foundational Issues: The Reading Program CatJL Special Issue, 2019 271
transformations were around, the Katz-Postal hypothesis23 was around, Deep 
Structure interpretation was around, and that led to really quite extravagant use of 
these devices, which had both a positive and a negative aspect, finally collapsed 
from its own weight because it was so extensive that it didn’t make sense. But the 
advantages were that it led to a lot of discoveries, there were lots of insights about 
language that came out of it. They’re not solutions, they’re problems, and it’s 
good to have problems, and led to explorations of new domains that hadn’t been 
looked at. All of that’s positive, and that’s commonly true for the promiscuous 
use of devices that are invented. The negative aspect is that it doesn’t lead us 
to the goal of trying to understand UG and the language faculty, and it’s also 
misleading in that it tends to present problems, which are interesting problems, 
   (2)  The notions of a ‘deep structure’ which separates syntax from semantics and a distinction 
between ‘transformations’ and ‘semantic interpretation rules’ are given up in favor of a 
single system of rules which relates semantic structure and surface structure via intermediate 
stages which deserve the name ‘syntactic’ no more and no less than ‘semantic’. 
   (3)  It is held that the rules needed to determine what a grammatical sentence may mean are 
also needed to determine what is grammatical at all. 
   (4)  A grammar is taken not to generate a set of surface structures but a set of derivations, and 
to consist of a set of derivational constraints: constraints on what combinations of elements 
may occur in semantic structure, on what combinations of elements may occur in surface 
structure, and on how different stages of a derivation may differ from each other.
23. Katz & Postal (1964). Two aspects of that proposal are relevant here:
   The semantic interpretation of the sentence
   The man hit the ball
   Must represent the meanings of the constituents of this sentence, i.e., the, man, hit, the, ball, 
the man, hit the ball, and the man hit the ball. But it must not provide any meaning for such 
substrings […] as the man hit or hit the. Obviously, this condition of adequacy can be fulfilled 
only if the syntactic component provides, for each sentence it generates, an enumeration of all, 
and only, its constituents (Katz & Postal 1964: 20).
  The fragment above explicitly adopts the definition of ‘generative’ used in Post (1943) and 
requires determinacy to hold. Also, and perhaps more importantly for Chomsky’s point,
   there are also many cases in the literature of syntactic facts characterized by optional singulary 
transformations where the output P- marker must have a semantic interpretation quite different 
from that of the input P- marker. Among these are the question transformation, the imperative 
transformation, the wh-attachment transformation, etc. Thus there are three possibilities: first, 
that no correctly formulated singulary transformation has an output with a semantic interpre-
tation distinct from its input and that those transformations in the literature which violate this 
claim are incorrect; second, that all singulary transformations affect meaning and those in 
the literature which do not are incorrect; third, that some do and some do not affect semantic 
interpretation and it is some specific feature of the particular transformations that determines 
which do and which do not.
   The first two alternatives are clearly preferable, even though what at present appear to be the 
facts throw more doubt upon them than upon the third, because they make no reference to spe-
cific features of a class of transformations. […] on a priori methodological grounds, the first of 
the three alternatives is the one which deserves to be provisionally accepted. This alternative 
claims that P2 [Type 2 Projection rules, a set of rules that apply to strings that have been applied 
transformations] play no role in the semantic interpretation of any sentoid [a sequence of gram-
matical formants with an associated semantic interpretation] without a generalized transforma-
tion in its T- marker. (Katz & Postal 1964: 32. Underline in the original)
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as if they were solutions, and they are not solutions: they are ways of stating a 
problem that we have to look at. 
Well, I think that a lot of this is now happening with Merge-style systems. 
These systems have had quite a lot of real and, I think, significant contributions. 
So, there’s accounts for the existence and ubiquity of displacement and reconstruc-
tion, which has always been regarded as an oddity of language, but it turns out to 
follow from the null hypothesis: if you pick the simplest combinatorial operation 
you get displacement and reconstruction, so that’s a pretty significant result, I 
think. It accounts for the deep and quite puzzling property of structural dependence, 
which has been worried about for 50 years: why do languages have this strange 
property, which increases computational complexity of use of language, since deal-
ing with linear order is much more trivial computationally? But it’s nevertheless 
ubiquitous. Why is that the case? Well, it turns out again that it follows from the 
null hypothesis, if you pick the simplest combinatorial operation, that’s what you 
get. Incidentally, this alone has many consequences for the future, raises difficult 
problems: it follows from this that anything involving linear order or any other 
arrangement cannot feed C-I. But there’s overwhelming evidence to the contrary: 
in fact, the whole history of linguistics assumes the opposite, right up to the present. 
It assumes that things like linear order and arrangement are what yield semantic 
interpretation and interact all over the place with syntactic operations. And there’s 
plenty of interesting contemporary work that seems to suggest the same thing. 
But if this is correct, and there’s good reason to think it is, those indeed give the 
only explanation for structural dependence, in fact the best possible explanation. 
We have a real problem, like the problem of the extravagant use of devices: major 
areas of descriptive wealth have to be completely rethought. We have to ask how 
we can show the descriptive consequences of using linear order or arrangement 
have to be settled in some other way, they have to be assigned to the externalization 
system. There’s also interesting neurolinguistic and psycholinguistic experiments 
that suggest exactly the same thing, including work that Ianthi [Tsimpli] talked 
about before. 
These results that I mention, if you take a look at them, were all achieved within 
a narrow version of Merge, not using the eccentric versions I’ve been raising ques-
tions about. The narrow version is pretty well defined in itself: it involves simple 
combinatorial operations and relies on the observation that there are two logical 
possibilities, External and Internal Merge. But the narrow version has been used 
within a framework that has been left kind of vague and unspecific. And that’s a 
problem. It’s the vagueness that has been exploited for the extensions of Merge 
like counter-cyclic Late Merge, Parallel Merge to yield Multidominance,24 and so 
on. Well, there are the usual advantages and problems that I’ve mentioned, but I 
24. The various theories grouped under the term ‘Multidominance’ can be said to have in common the 
rejection of the so-called Single Mother Condition (Sampson, 1975), such that a node in a structural 
description can be dominated by more than a single node (i.e., can have more than one ‘mother’). 
See Citko (2005); Peters and Richie (1981); McCawley (1982); Levine (1985). The locally multi-
rooted graph proposal in Morin & O’Milley (1969) (who refer to these structures as vines) is also 
relevant.
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think that these extensions are illegitimate and we have to somehow show that and 
show that the narrow version, which yields the interesting results, is somehow the 
only legitimate one. That’s the question I will look at. 
Well, there are two ways to proceed. One is the boring way, so I’ll ignore it: 
that’s to stipulate the narrow version explicitly: say ‘this is what it is, the others 
don’t work’. We don’t want to do that. The interesting way is to take a look at the 
computational operations of language from a completely different point of view, to 
start by asking ‘what are the general desiderata that any computational operations 
for language should meet?’ Notice there are two considerations here: first, what 
should any computational operation be like, simply on grounds of computational 
complexity and third factor conditions?25 And second, it’s got to be specific to 
language, an organic system which has its own properties. So there are those two 
conditions or desiderata. And the idea will be that the program will be constructed 
in a general framework that accommodates a wide range of alternatives including 
all the extensions, including other things that we can think of that haven’t been used 
yet. And then ask: what survives careful analysis in terms of these conditions? In 
the hope of showing that only the narrow version passes muster under these condi-
tions, and which then leaves us with the challenge of facing the wealth of descrip-
tive results that have been reached by what I hope to show are illegitimate means 
and methods. The better approach is the one that provides insight into the nature of 
language and explanatory adequacy, so let’s proceed with it first formulating some 
general principles that any operation for language ought to meet.
The first and most obvious one is simply descriptive adequacy. It ought to get 
the facts right. And of course we all know that’s not innocuous, as we don’t know 
what the facts are a priori. Maybe something we think is a fact about language 
turns out to be a performance fact. What counts as a fact depends on theoretical 
understanding and empirical discoveries. Nevertheless, it’s a pretty good guideline 
to proceed and I should say that, now that we have –thanks to Charles [Yang]– a 
sharp core-periphery distinction, that helps independent study on the fact of what is 
a performance property, that also helps. And we have reasonably good guidelines, I 
think it’s safe to start from that. But it poses a problem. One problem is that Merge 
violates it. Merge does not satisfy descriptive adequacy. This is a fact that’s pretty 
crucial. So if you take a look at the simplest case of Merge, that is Internal Merge, 
that’s the one that involves least search, External Merge involves huge search, it’s 
a complicated operation.26 Internal Merge only involves search within the syntactic 
25. In the words of Chomsky (2005: 6), the third factor in language design includes:
   iii) Principles not specific to the faculty of language.
   The third factor falls into several subtypes: (a) principles of data analysis that might be 
used in language acquisition and other domains; (b) principles of structural architecture and 
developmental constraints that enter into canalization, organic form, and action over a wide 
range, including principles of efficient computation, which would be expected to be of particular 
significance for computational systems such as language. It is the second of these subcategories 
that should be of particular significance in determining the nature of attainable languages.
26. The ‘search space’ in IM is limited to the local phrase marker under consideration, in EM the search 
space is potentially the entire Lexicon.
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object that we are looking at. So suppose we apply just Internal Merge, then what do 
we get? Well, basically we get the successor function. So suppose you have a single 
element lexicon and we apply Merge to it; we have a single element, call it 0, and 
we apply Merge to it and you get the set containing 0, call that 1. Apply it again, you 
get the set containing 0 and 1, it’s 2. And basically you get the successor function.27 
But language isn’t the successor function, maybe arithmetic is. And in fact that’s 
part of the argument that maybe that’s why humans know arithmetic, because it’s the 
simplest case of language. But that’s not language. Well, suppose you apply Internal 
Merge. Then, if you think about it, what you get is (if you look at it in terms of trees) 
a tree in which the leaves are lexical items, whatever lexical items are, you get a tree 
with lexical items coming off. Well, that’s not language. So, these two operations, 
incidentally, are appropriate for standard formal systems.28 So if you are making 
standard formal systems you can use these methods, but not language, because lan-
guage has a different property: language has exocentric constructions, it has things 
of the form {XP, YP} like, say, {NP, VP}, and you can’t get them by just internal 
Merge, so there’s a problem. The operation Merge violates the simplest condition: 
descriptive adequacy. Well, that has (kind of) been overcome by a tacit assump-
tion, and this tacit assumption has to be made precise, as it has consequences. And 
the tacit assumption is that you can construct syntactic objects in parallel and then 
bring them together somewhere. Now, that presupposes that you have a workspace 
in which operations are being carried out. And, what’s the workspace? Well, that 
hasn’t been properly answered. And fixing it has consequences. The one immediate 
consequence is that operations, say, the right version of Merge should be operations 
on the workspace, not on a particular syntactic object, because they can change the 
workspace. And in fact, if you look at these –what I think are- illegitimate operations 
like, say, Parallel Merge, they in fact involve separate elements of the workspace, so 
they are modifying the entire workspace. And since the program I am suggesting is 
to present desiderata that include everything, these fall within it, just like much else. 
27. The recursive set-theoretic construction of the naturals is due to Von Neumann, e.g., (1923) (within 
the more general framework of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory), and it is equivalent to Peano’s (which 
was however not based on set theory). First, let
  s(a) = a ⋃ {a}, call s the successor function
 And
  0 = Ø
 Then, define
  1 = s(0) = s(Ø) = Ø ⋃ {Ø} = {0}
  2 = s(1) = s({0}) = {0} ⋃ {{0}}
 But we know that {0} = 1, so
  2 = {0} ⋃ {1} = {0, 1}
 Which means that 2 is defined as the ordered set containing 0 and 1. In the same way, 3 is defined 
recursively as
  s({0, 1}) = {0, 1} ⋃ {2} = {0, 1, 2} (or, equivalently, {0, 1, {0, 1}})
28. Standard here just means the kind usually discussed in general (including linguistic) contexts: 
propositional calculus, quantification theory, arithmetic…. Not say category theory. (Chomsky PC)
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So the operations, including the right version of Merge, have to be operations 
on the workspace. That raises all kinds of questions, to which I’ll turn directly. 
The first condition is descriptive adequacy. 
The second condition is some version of the Strong Minimalist Thesis, I men-
tioned reasons why we ought to be able to approach that. There are specific conse-
quences like, for example, Inclusiveness:29 the operations should not add anything: 
they should not add order, they should not add new features, or anything like that. 
Of course, externalization violates all these conditions, it violates just about eve-
rything, so that’s not surprising. 
A third condition, which is specific to language, is not true of, say, formal 
proof theory or something like that, is that we should be restricting the computa-
tional resources. We are dealing with an organic system with limited computational 
resources. In fact, quite limited, if you think about the speed of neural transmission 
and so on and so forth. So a third principle is restrict computational resources, and 
in the best case (the case that we ought to try to achieve, if possible), the opera-
tions should never extend the workspace; they should maybe contract it, but not 
expand it. 
The fourth principle, I already mentioned, is determinism, the principle that 
was required for Charles’ results. So, if the structural conditions for a rule holds for 
some workspace, then the structural change must be unique, it must be determinate, 
unlike, say, phrase structure grammar.
The fifth condition is, centrally, a condition of coherence or stability that 
says that the properties of a syntactic object can’t change in the course of the 
derivation,30 so something that refers to Mary on line 1 cannot refer to John on line 
3. There’s an interesting history about this, that there’s no time to go into, but in the 
history of science it turns out that in classical physics and mathematics this condi-
29. Chomsky (1995) defines the Inclusiveness Condition as follows: 
   A “perfect language” should meet the condition of inclusiveness: any structure formed by the 
computation (in particular, π and λ) is constituted of elements already present in the lexical items 
selected for N; no new objects are added in the course of computation apart from rearrange-
ments of lexical properties (in particular, no indices, bar levels in the sense of X-bar theory, etc. 
(Chomsky 1995: 228)
 Also, footnote 7 of Chapter 4, p. 381: 
   Note that considerations of this nature can be invoked only within a fairly disciplined minimalist 
approach. Thus, with sufficiently rich formal devices (say, set theory), counterparts to any object 
(nodes, bars, indices, etc.) can readily be constructed from features. There is no essential differ-
ence, then, between admitting new kinds of objects and allowing richer use of formal devices; 
we assume that these (basically equivalent) options are permitted only when forced by empirical 
properties of language.
30. See, e.g., Lasnik & Uriagereka’s (2005: 53, 112) Conservation Laws:
   1st Conservation Law: Conservation of Lexical Information
   All information in a syntactic derivation comes from the lexicon and interpretable lexical infor-
mation cannot be destroyed. 
   2nd Conservation Law: Conservation of Structural Information
   Interpretable structural units created in a syntactic derivation cannot be altered 
  The notion of faithfulness constraint in Optimality Theory is also consistent with this dictum. 
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tion was crucially violated, as in Newton’s work, with quite major consequences. 
But anyway, this condition has to be satisfied.
And the sixth condition is the fact that language crucially involves recursion. 
That’s a universal human property of the human faculty of language (there’s a 
lot of confusion about this in the popular literature, which I will not go into). 
It’s an invariant property of humans that the language faculty involves recursion. 
Well, what’s the basic idea of recursion? It’s that every object that’s generated 
must be available for later computations. So, for example, if you’re doing formal 
proof theory, and you prove a theorem, you have to be able anywhere later in the 
proof to go back to that theorem and follow its consequences. That’s formal proof 
theory, but remember, we are not doing formal proof theory, we have an organic 
object which has to meet other conditions. But in our case we want to try this sixth 
condition given condition 2, the SMT, we want to formulate recursion in a way 
that stipulates no specific properties, so we don’t put any extra conditions on it: 
recursion ought to be free. So what we’ll say is that a syntactic object is accessible 
(that’s a technical term) to further operations if it’s been generated, period. So that’s 
general recursion without further stipulations. 
Well, I’ll stop with these conditions for time reasons. The basic ones are the 
first and second (descriptive adequacy and SMT), if we think it through, the others 
pretty much follow. 
There are consequences right away from the definition of recursion. One conse-
quence shows that what’s been called the Extension Condition is a mistake, because 
the Extension Condition simply stipulated that the only accessible syntactic objects 
are the whole syntactic objects, that’s the Extension Condition. But the general 
definition of recursion tells us that anything inside should be accessible. And that 
means that one of the arguments against Late, counter-cyclic Merge doesn’t work, 
the one that said ‘it violates the Extension Condition’. It doesn’t matter in this case, 
because the major argument, the EKS [Epstein, Kitahara, Seely] argument against 
Late, counter-cyclic Merge is the substitution operation, which is unacceptable. So 
the conclusion holds, but not the entire argument, the Extension Condition [one] 
has to be withdrawn. 
Much more interesting is what happens if we take the simplest cases. Suppose 
the workspace consists of two elements, the set {a, b} (whatever a and b are). So 
we have the result of Merging a and b. That’s one of the things in the workspace. 
The second thing in the workspace, call it c, a syntactic object. So that’s the sim-
plest case, and it’s worth a very close look because it turns out that the problems 
that undermine, I think, all of the extensions of Merge, already show up with this 
simple case, so it’s worth looking at this simple case carefully:
3) W = {{a, b}, c}
So let’s take a look at that and the problems that it raises. 
Notice first that a and b have to be accessible to further operations by the defi-
nition of recursion. And in fact they are, because they are part of the first element, 
the set {a, b}. It has already been generated, so it’s accessible. However, if you 
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look further, the condition of recursion does suggest that the workspace that results 
from the operation that yields (3) should be as follows. If we Merge:
4) 
The definition of recursion suggests that the workspace should be:
5) {{{a, b}, c}, a, b}
Because a and b are both accessible. And, as I mentioned, that’s not a strong 
argument. But the general notion of recursion works like this. So if you’re doing, 
say, proof theory, the axioms and every line you’ve generated are still there, they 
are part of the workspace (we don’t need a workspace for proof theory, but the set 
created by the operation would be (5)). So that raises a question: is that the right 
answer? Should the result of Merge, or the improvement of Merge, be an operation 
on the workspace which yields (5)? Well, suppose we are to do this.
Notice that first of all we violate the condition of descriptive adequacy [condi-
tion 1], and the reason is quite simple: we have (4) in the workspace and it has to 
be available for further operations, which can yield (6) 
6) 
 
X is a structure of arbitrary complexity. Since a and b are in the workspace we 
could merge a to X 
7) 
 
And it means that we have what amounts to a movement operation which 
violates every possible rule on movement, so we can’t accept that. Furthermore, 
it violates condition 3, the condition on not expanding the workspace [compare 
the size of the workspace in (4) and (5)].
Another reason is that it violates determinism [condition 4]: suppose that there’s 
some other operation going on that targets, say, a, we don’t know which a it applies 
to. So already there are three conditions that are violated.
And this goes back to Feynman’s argument: we are getting somewhere because 
we have several independent lines of argument (each reasonable in itself) which 
yield the same result. 
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Well, there is a proposal, very widely used in the literature that we are talking 
about, which says we can overcome this by developing a new theory of movement, 
one which doesn’t involve Internal Merge. So suppose we bar Internal Merge 
and develop a representational theory of movement, which just involves External 
Merge. That’s very widely used, in multidimensionality. That’s a terrible idea: it 
violates every condition you can think of, and it has its own problems.
So take for example Topicalization or Left Dislocation:
8) [Mary’s book]1, John read [Mary’s book]2
This is the underlying structure. If you interpret it as Topicalization, then 
[Mary’s book]1 has to be identical in all respects to [Mary’s book]2. So, if Mary 
owns the book, that’s the topic, the book that Mary owns. But then what John 
read, it has to be the book that she owns, not the one that she wrote, and it’s the 
same Mary. On the other hand, in the Left Dislocation case this isn’t true, they are 
totally unrelated. So we can say ‘as for Mary’s book’, that’s what we’re talking 
about, John read Mary’s book, maybe it’s a different Mary, maybe it’s the book 
she owns…
In the Topicalization case, [Mary’s book]1 and [Mary’s book]2 need to be cop-
ies. In the Left Dislocation case, they are repetitions. Well, that’s a critical distinc-
tion. And in this new representational theory, there’s no way of describing it. And 
in the old theory, the narrow theory, there are trivial ways of describing it: simply 
define the concept of copy as something formed by Internal Merge, everything else 
is a repetition. And that captures exactly the intuition behind this, namely, that if 
there’s something new that comes into the derivation from the outside it’s a repeti-
tion, that has nothing to do with what’s inside. So if I say
9) John saw John
They are different guys. If it’s a copy, it’s something inside the derivation. It’s 
not adding anything new from the outside. And that’s trivially computed at the 
phase level. So within the narrow version a simple answer can be made to work, 
that’s all. But in the new theory there’s no answer at all, other than abandoning 
the hope of distinguishing copies from repetitions. And that’s incidentally only the 
beginning of a lot of other difficulties. 
Another difficulty with this approach is that you are barring Internal Merge. But 
that’s the simplest possible operation. So in order to follow this approach you are 
saying ‘the simplest operation is ruled out’ for no reason. And incidentally, barring 
Internal Merge means losing the explanation for the ubiquity of displacement and 
reconstruction, which is a pretty big result. 
Another consequence is that the elements manipulated by External Merge can 
be of arbitrary complexity, it could be anything at all, which means a huge amount 
of extra computation. And to amplify that, this new object, as we know, has to be 
inserted at every point of the successive cyclic operation, because as you know 
there are consequences at the various points of insertion in movement, at the vP 
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phase and the CP phase, there are both semantic and phonological output conditions 
(as Doug [Saddy] showed many years ago in Indonesian).31 So you have massive 
new computation which has to be introduced at every point of the successive cyclic 
operation, and it goes on like that. 
The result is, there’s lots of loss and no gain whatsoever, because these con-
structions are still ruled out by other conditions. So I think that’s a non-starter. But 
how do we approach the matter? We have to redefine Merge as an operation of 
replacement, so that Merge would say:32
10) Replace(a, b) by {a, b}
That’s the way Merge was defined, back in 1995,33 in the initial publications in 
the Minimalist Program. Incidentally, it was defined as follows
10’)  a. Replace(a, b) by {a, b}
 b. Eliminate(a, b) 
Some of the recent formalizations call it Remove. But, where do you eliminate 
it from? Well, that was not answered. But now we have an answer, we know where 
it’s eliminated from, it’s the workspace. So we have an operation which replaces a 
and b by the set {a, b} and eliminates a and b from the workspace; that will over-
come the problems that we discussed with the earlier example (5). But we want to 
do this without a new rule Eliminate. We’re trying to keep to the SMT, we don’t 
want new rules or anything like that. 
The simplest way to do this is the following:
Suppose we have a workspace with a set of objects. From that workspace we 
can determine a sequence Σ:
31. Saddy (1990, 1991). 
32. See also Collins (2017); Epstein, Kitahara & Seely (2015).
33. The relevant definitions are the following:
   We now adopt (more or less) the assumptions of LSLT, with a single generalized transformation 
GT that takes a phrase marker K1 and inserts it in a designated empty position Ø in a phrase 
marker K, forming the new phrase marker K*, which satisfies X-bar theory. Computation pro-
ceeds in parallel, selecting from the lexicon freely at any point. At each point in the derivation, 
then, we have a structure Σ, which we may think of as a set of phrase markers. […] GT is a 
substitution operation. It targets K and substitutes K1 for Ø in K. But Ø is not drawn from the 
lexicon; therefore, it must have been inserted by GT itself. GT, then, targets K, adds Ø, and 
substitutes K1 for Ø, forming K*, which must satisfy X-bar theory. Note that this is a description 
of the inner workings of a single operation, GT. (Chomsky, 1995: 189) 
  In this context, GT (Merge) is defined as a binary substitution operation, and Move-α is its 
singulary version. In ‘Categories and Transformations’ Chomsky defines GT as follows:
   C(HL) must include a second procedure [other than Select] which combines syntactic objects 
already formed. A derivation converges only if this operation has applies often enough to leave 
us with just a single object, also exhausting the initial Numeration. The simplest such operation 
takes a pair of syntactic objects (SOi, SOj) and replaces them by a new combined syntactic object 
SOij. Call this operation Merge. (Chomsky 1995: 226)
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11) Σ = (X1, X2, …Xn)
That has the following properties: it’s the shortest sequence such that 
(i) Each Xi is accessible (that’s the definition of recursion)
(ii) Σ exhausts the workspace
And we can define a new operation called MERGE:
12) MERGE(Σ) = {{X1, X2}, X3, …Xn}
That’s a replace operation. It replaces X1 and X2, the first members of the 
sequence, by a set, and it doesn’t have any Remove operation. 
If you look at this, a couple of things follow. 
First of all, this says that you can take any two accessible elements in the 
workspace, any at all, and you can MERGE them in the ‘capitals’ sense [i.e., in 
the sense of (12)], and you map the workspace into a new workspace. This happens 
to accommodate all of the extensions that are around, plus more than you can think 
of. And the next step you have to take is to make sure that the legitimate operations 
External Merge and Internal Merge are included. And they are, EM, in fact, yields 
exactly the same results if you think it through you’ll see that EM in the old 
definition (now extended to a definition of the workspace) yields (12) and IM yields 
exactly the same thing, which makes sense, because they are the same operation; 
they are just two possible cases of the same operation. So, naturally, they yield the 
same results: Internal Merge is, again, the simplest operation, with the least search. 
MERGE, in this new definition, satisfies condition 2, SMT: it’s the simplest 
computational operation you can think of on the workspace, and it excludes the 
bad cases. It keeps the workspace from expanding: notice that the new result is not 
larger than the original one. And in fact External Merge always reduces the work-
space by one; Internal Merge keeps it the same. So we are not violating condition 
3, as the workspace is not expanding indefinitely. 
Now, there’s an obvious qualification here: sentences can be longer and longer, 
so there’s got to be some way of building up the workspace. The minimal way to 
extend the workspace, therefore the one we want to keep to, is to take two lexical 
items a, b out of the Lexicon (it doesn’t matter what the Lexicon is; certainly not 
words, but that’s been recognized since LSLT) and form from them the set {a, b}. 
If the Borer-Marantz idea about roots and categorization of roots is correct34, then 
34. Marantz (1997: 215) defines this position as follows:
   Roots like √DESTROY and √GROW […] are category neutral, neutral between N and V. When 
the roots are placed in a nominal environment, the result is a “nominalization”; when the roots 
are placed in a verbal environment, they become verbs.
  These ‘environments’ are defined shortly after:
   Among the functional heads in whose environments roots become verbs (these may be “aspec-
tual” in some sense), one, call it “v-1,” projects an agent while another, call it “v-2,” does not. 
These little “v’s” could be different flavors of a single head, or perhaps there is some unified 
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these will always be composed of a root and a categorizer, for example n, v, that says 
what category it is. In any event, two things: notice that it’s not enough to take one of 
them out of the workspace because that will just External Merge whatever we have 
and it won’t add anything. But if you pick these two things out of the workspace then 
you can go on to build a new syntactic object. So that’s the minimal way to allow 
the workspace to grow, if you can get away with it, of course, and still keep to the 
SMT. Other than that, the operations themselves never expand the workspace, so 
that’s satisfying the third condition. 
I’ll mention some things than have to be done. You have to show that the two 
legitimate operations, EM and IM (which are the same operation) satisfy determi-
nacy [condition 4]. That’s not trivial. But if we look at it, there’s an answer, as to 
how they satisfy determinacy. 
Then, you have to look at other cases. I’ll just mention a couple I won’t go 




And we Merge {X, Y}. You take two things inside the syntactic object, and you 
Merge them. I don’t think anybody suggested that, but it falls within the general 
framework. And if you think it through, you’ll see that it violates all the conditions 
that the simplest case violates. 
So now let’s take one that is in the literature for which there has been quite a 
lot of descriptive work and that is Parallel Merge. So we have an object
14) 
 
That’s one. And we have some other one, call it Z, and that’s the whole work-
space. And then we Merge:
account that could have a single head optionally project an agent and thus cover both v-1 and 
v-2. (Marantz 1997: 217)
 Conversely, the ‘nominalizing environment’ is taken in Marantz (1997: 218) to be the domain of 
D. More recent proposals have proposed a ‘little x’ for each environment, such that v is a verbal-
izer, n is a nominalizer, etc. (see Borer 2005a, b). The root (pun intended) of the transformational 
approach to nominalizations, which is essential to understand these proposals, is to be found in 
Lees (1960). 
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15) 
 
Forming {Y, Z}. That’s what’s called Parallel Merge. And it’s usually described 
as Internal Merge, so that Y is internally merging to Z. But that’s not Internal 
Merge. It’s some new kind of Merge which doesn’t fit the narrow version. It’s 
usually written like this:
16) 
 
That’s the notation used in the Multidominance literature. But that notation 
doesn’t mean anything, there’s no such object. In fact, in general, trees are an 
extremely misleading notation, the root may have nothing there, there may not be 
a root. And this temptation to draw all sorts of lines, that’s all over the place, and 
much of it can’t be reduced to Merge. I won’t go through this today, I’ll leave it 
as an exercise. But (16) has exactly the problems of the trivial case, it violates all 
the same conditions. 
That, incidentally, eliminates all the work on merge-based Multidominance, 
which has led to very interesting results, ATB, all these things. But they are left 
as problems. And again, if you think about Richard Feynman’s observation, that’s 
what we are finding, case by case. 
Well, pretty much the same is true of other conditions; Sidewards Merge is 
even more complicated, there’s lots of other problems. But as far as I know, every 
case that’s in the literature aside from the narrow version and other cases that you 
can dream of that aren’t in the literature violate all the conditions that I’ve men-
tioned. Again, I’ll leave it as an exercise. But what was intuitively the old version 
of EM and IM (intuitively, because it was never stated precisely), with the notions 
Replace and Eliminate, the question ‘Eliminate from what?’ was never answered. 
And then when you answer it, you conclude that the operation Merge has to be 
redefined as an operation on the workspace, one which doesn’t have this word 
eliminate and meets the conditions we listed.
And I think that converges down to what pretty much was assumed intuitively. 
Which means, in fact, that for practical purposes (not being precise) you can use the 
old definition, which you know is wrong, because it’s the only definition, I think, 
which satisfies a range of legitimate general desiderata on what every operation 
ought to be. So all of those background conditions are a framework in which any 
computational operation for language must be selected. And it happens, I think, 
to work out [that] that was what we were using intuitively in the narrow version.
Well, that leaves a couple of big problems, first of all showing that what I just 
said is correct. Which would mean solving a lot of problems which I am leaving 
for you to solve. 
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But what doesn’t work and is easily a big problem is taking everything that’s 
been described in the extensions of Merge, like everything in the Multidominance 
theory and all the rest, and showing that there is a legitimate way to pay off those 
promissory notes – I think if you look at that there may be some interesting ways. 
So there’s lots of work to do. I’ll stop there. 
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